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ABSTRACT In this paper, a game theory-based partitioning algorithm for large-scale systems (LSS) is
proposed. More specifically, a game over nodes is introduced in a model predictive control framework. The
Shapley value of this game is used to rank the communication links of the control network based on their
impact on the overall system performance. A randomized method to estimate the Shapley value of each
node and also an efficient redistribution of the resulting value to the links involved are considered to relieve
the combinatorial explosion issues related to LSS. Once the partitioning solution is obtained, a sensitivity
analysis is proposed to give a measure of its performance. Likewise, a greedy fine tuning procedure is
considered to increase the optimality of the partitioning results. The full Barcelona drinking water network
is analyzed as a real LSS case study, showing the effectiveness of the proposed approach in comparison with
other partitioning schemes available in the literature.
INDEX TERMS Coalitional control, cooperative game theory, system partitioning, randomized methods,
Shapley value, large-scale systems (LSS), drinking water networks (DWN).
I. INTRODUCTION
Model predictive control (MPC) has evolved considerably
over the last decades. It designates an ample range of control
methods that make explicit use of a model of the process to
obtain the control signal by minimizing an objective func-
tion [1]. Its flexibility – for any type of model can be used –
and the ease of dealing with constraints and dead times are
well-known advantages of this methodology. In particular,
this paper focuses on distributed MPC (DMPC) schemes,
where the overall control problem is divided into smaller
pieces assigned to local controllers or agents, which are
able to communicate among them. Typical features of these
approaches, such as scalability, modularity, and the capacity
of controlling large-scale systems (LSS) [2], will be very
welcome in this work.
Each agent involved in a distributed scheme has partial
system information and communicates with neighbors for the
sake of coordination [3]. Typically, the partition of the overall
system is assumed to be given before the DMPC strategy
is applied, and it is calculated during the system modeling,
based on physical insight, experience or intuition, and other
methods available in the literature, where the starting point
is commonly associated with the seminal work of Siljak [4].
Recently, many partitioning schemes have appeared, based
on graph theory [5]–[8], states and inputs estimation [9],
social network algorithms [10], genetic algorithms [11], or
PageRank [12]. In any case, no single partitioning strategy is
the best fit for all situations. This way, specific partitioning
techniques have been applied to real LSS case studies, e.g.,
in water systems [10], [13]–[15], power networks [16], [17],
biological systems [18], integrated circuits [19], and urban
traffic networks [20]. In fact, LSS might involve a big com-
munication network implying the handling of large amount of
data, which could yield in high computational costs. There-
fore, performing the partition of the problem into smaller
pieces is a natural solution for managing these networks.
In this work, the coalitional control framework, which can
be summarized as a set of dynamic partitioning methods for
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networked control systems that seek for a trade-off between
communication burden and control performance [21]–[26],
is used to determine static neighborhoods that define the
partitioning of an LSS. That is, despite its dynamic scope,
the coalitional framework can be used to obtain offline system
information, i.e., independent from the implementation of the
control scheme. In this coalitional context, the well-known
Shapley value, a cooperative game solution concept pre-
sented originally in [27], is used here to provide information
regarding the relevance of the agents and the links involved
in a communication network, following the ideas described
in [21]–[23]. The specific contributions of this article with
respect these earlier works are the following:
a) A game defined in the set of agents is proposed here,
where the closed-loop stage cost of the system is accu-
mulated along the simulation scenario. This is a dif-
ference with respect to previous works, were open-
loop costs where used at each time step. This game is
associated with the cost function of a coalitional MPC
scheme, in the line of [23]. Note that the viewpoint is
changed with respect to [21] and [22], where a game
with the players being the links was related to the cost
function of a coalitional control approach based on
linear feedback gains.
b) The Shapley value, which gives an averaged contribu-
tion of each player into the game, is calculated here
by using randomized methods [28], [29] satisfying a
minimum bounded error requirement. The relevance of
the links is obtained by an index, introduced in [23],
which redistributes the Shapley value from the agents
to the links.
c) In [21] and [23], a very preliminar partitioning that uses
few thresholds to classify the links as a function of the
control performance is proposed. Here, the partitioning
algorithm is drastically improved by introducing new
parameters that balance the size of the communica-
tion components. Additionally, a new set that refers to
expensive links among components is also introduced
here to provide a proper definition of the network con-
figuration after applying the partitioning method.
d) A sensitivity analysis that gives a measure of the
partitioning control performance is included in this
paper. Through this analysis, the proposed partition-
ing solution is compared with other schemes available
in [10] and [13], and also with the centralized and
decentralized configurations. Moreover, this analysis is
recursively implemented in a greedy fashion [30], [31]
to make a fine tuning of the partitioning approach.
Notice that the results reported in previous works were
only suitable for academic small networks. Nevertheless,
through the combination of a) and b) the computational
and combinatorial explosion issues related to LSS are mit-
igated and it is possible to implement the new partitioning
algorithm introduced in c) and d) in such networks. More-
over, the full Barcelona drinking water network (DWN),
modeled in [13] and [14], is chosen as a real LSS case
study to assess the effectiveness of the proposed partition-
ing approach, which represents an additional contribution
of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, the problem setting is stated in a coalitional
control framework. Next, in Section III, a game over nodes
is considered, being the Shapley value utilized as a means of
distributing the cost of the game among the agents. Likewise,
a randomized method to estimate the Shapley value and a
redistribution of this value to the set of links are proposed
to deal with combinatorial explosion issues. In Section IV,
a Shapley value-based partitioning algorithm is introduced.
The partitioning performance is evaluated by means of a
sensitivity analysis, whose information is also recursively
used for a fine tuning of the proposed approach. In Section V,
the Barcelona DWN is presented as the case study, with
the corresponding partitioning results and comparisons with
other approaches being presented in Section VI. Finally, con-
clusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF COALITIONAL CONTROL
Consider the class of distributed linear systems composed of
N = {1, 2, . . . , |N |} interconnected subsystems or agents.
The dynamics of agent i ∈ N can be mathematically
described, with k ∈ Z+, as
xi(k + 1) = Aiixi(k)+ Biiui(k)+ wi(k),
wi(k) =
∑
j 6=i
[
Aijxj(k)+ Bijuj(k)
]+ Bpidi(k), (1)
where xi(k) ∈ Rnxi is the state vector of agent i, ui(k) ∈ Rnui
its corresponding input vector, and wi(k) ∈ Rnxi the related
disturbances, which can be either external to the whole sys-
tem, denoted by di(k) ∈ Rndi , or be caused by the neighbors
as well. Likewise, Aii ∈ Rnxi×nxi ,Bii ∈ Rnxi×nui , Aij ∈
Rnxi×nxj ,Bij ∈ Rnxi×nuj and Bpi ∈ Rnxi×ndi are system
matrices of suitable dimensions. Both states and inputs are
constrained into independent sets defined by a collection of
linear inequalities, i.e.,
xi(k) ∈ Xi, Xi ⊆ Rnxi , ui(k) ∈ Ui, Ui ⊆ Rnui . (2)
A. NETWORKED COALITIONAL STRUCTURE
In standard coalitional control, the agents are merged at each
time instant into several disjoint neighborhoods or communi-
cation components C1, C2, . . . , Cnc , verifying
⋃nc
s=1 Cs = N .
Conversely, the goal in this paper is to use coalitional con-
trol to find a time-independent set denoted as NC =
{C1, C2, . . . , Cnc}, i.e., nc = |NC |, assuming that agents in
N are initially connected by a network described by an
undirected graph (N , E), where E = EN = N × N is the
set of links corresponding to all feasible communication con-
nections among the agents. Hence, the number of elements in
both sets is, in the worst case, connected by [21], [23]
|E | = |N |(|N | − 1)
2
, (3)
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which corresponds to the number of links of a complete
network. This case, which is the most demanding in terms
of problem size, will be assumed throughout the paper. Note
that, under this premise, any group or coalition C ⊆ N of
agents is internally connected.
Each link l ∈ E can be classified according to its relevance
from a control viewpoint. This way, it can be more profitable
for the overall system performance to fix/disconnect some
links permanently. In this work, the partitioning objective will
focus on finding out those links. When a specific coalition C
is formed, a model analogous to (1) is calculated at a coalition
level, i.e.,
xC(k + 1) = ACCxC(k)+ BCCuC(k)+ wC(k),
wC(k) =
∑
j/∈C
[
ACjxj(k)+ BCjuj(k)
]+ BpCdC(k), (4)
with xC(k) = [xi(k)]i∈C ∈ RnxC , uC(k) = [ui(k)]i∈C ∈ RnuC
and wC(k) = [wi(k)]i∈C ∈ RnwC , dC(k) = [di(k)]i∈C ∈
RndC being respectively the coalitional states, inputs, overall
disturbances and external disturbances that aggregate the cor-
responding vectors, and ACC ∈ RnxC×nxC , BCC ∈ RnxC×nuC ,
ACj ∈ RnxC×nxj , BCj ∈ RnxC×nuj and BpC ∈ RnxC×ndC
are obtained by aggregating the corresponding individual
matrices. The coalitional constraints become
xC(k) ∈ XC ⊆ RnxC , XC =
∏
i∈C
Xi,
uC(k) ∈ UC ⊆ RnuC , UC =
∏
i∈C
Ui. (5)
Finally, from an overall centralized viewpoint, the system is
described by
xN (k + 1) = AN xN (k)+ BN uN (k)+ BpN dN (k), (6)
with xN (k) ∈ RnxN , uN (k) ∈ RnuN , dN (k) ∈ RndN being,
respectively, the overall state, input and disturbance vectors.
Note that from a centralized viewpoint, wN (k) is only com-
posed of external disturbances BpN dN (k). The centralized
constraints have the form
xN (k) ∈ XN ⊆ RnxN , XN =
∏
i∈N
Xi,
uN (k) ∈ UN ⊆ RnuN , UN =
∏
i∈N
Ui. (7)
B. CONTROL OBJECTIVE
Under an MPC framework, the goal of each coalitional con-
troller C ⊆ N is to drive a sequence of future states over
a prediction horizon Np, that is, XC(k + 1 : k + Np) =
{xC(k + 1), . . . , xC(k + Np)}, by using the most appropri-
ate control sequence. To this end, the controller solves the
following open-loop finite-horizon optimization problem at
each time instant k:
U∗C(k : k + Np − 1)
= arg min
UC (k:k+Np−1)
Np−1∑
r=0
`C
(
xC(k + r + 1), uC(k + r)
)
,
(8)
subject to (4), (5), the aggregate forecast of the expected
local disturbances WˆC(k : k + Np − 1) = {wˆC(k), . . . , wˆC
(k + Np − 1)}, and a measured coalitional initial state xˆc(k).
Likewise, `C
(
xC(k),uC(k)
)
is a certain convex coalitional
stage cost that is minimized along the prediction horizon.
As a result, the sequence of the coalitional optimal control
inputs over Np, that is, U∗C(k : k +Np− 1) = {u∗C(k), . . . ,u∗C
(k + Np − 1)} is obtained. Only the first control input u∗C(k)
is actually applied, and the rest of elements are discarded.
At the next time instant, (8) is solved again in a receding
horizon fashion.
Notice that a coalition can be a singleton. In this case,
each local controller i ∈ N solves an optimization problem
analogous to (8) by taking C = i. Likewise, to compute a cen-
tralized MPC scheme implemented in a distributed fashion it
is enough to calculate the optimal input sequence by taking
C = N and solving (8).
III. COOPERATIVE GAMES AND THE SHAPLEY VALUE
In [21] and [22], the set of links E was interpreted as the set of
players of a cooperative game whose characteristic function
assigned a value to each of the different configurations of
links or network topologies. As commented before, in the
approach proposed this paper it is assumed that the number of
links is related to the agents by (3). Hence, to mitigate com-
binatorial explosion issues associated to LSS, the perspective
of the aforementioned works is changed here, as done in [23],
to working directly with a cooperative game (N , v) defined
over set of agentsN . To this end, a cost function v that assigns
a cost to each coalition of players C ⊆ N is defined by
v(C, xN ) =
Tsim−1∑
k=0
[
`C
(
xC(k + 1),u∗C(k)
)
+
∑
i/∈C
`i
(
xi(k + 1),u∗i (k)
)]
, (9)
with `i
(
xi(k),ui(k)
)
and `C
(
xC(k),uC(k)
)
being the stage
costs, which will be defined for the case study in Section V-B,
and where Tsim is the number of simulation steps used to
accumulate the closed-loop stage cost of the system over the
simulation time. This function v is computed by applying at
each time step the first element of the control sequence of
coalition C, i.e., u∗C(k), which is obtained by solving (8). The
rest of the agents calculate their input sequences u∗i (k) by
solving (8), with C = i, independently.
Remark 1: Equation (9) is evaluated with input informa-
tion from all agents, independently whether they are either
in or out the coalition C. Each coalition C solves its own
optimization problem, which is decoupled from the rest of the
network. Hence, 2|N | values are needed to fully characterize
function v using the standard approach, which is not the case
in this work, as it will be shown in the next subsection by
considering randomized methods.
Once the game is defined, the Shapley value [27] is con-
sidered here to get the corresponding cost that each player
expects from the game. This value assigns to game (N , v)
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vector φ(N , v), defined ∀i ∈ N as
φi(N , v)
=
∑
C⊆N ,i/∈C
|C|!(|N | − |C| − 1)!
|N |! [v(C∪{i}, xN )−v(C, xN )],
(10)
i.e., themarginal contribution of each agent i ∈ N is averaged
for all possible coalition permutations it can be part of.
Remark 2: Equation (10) was originally defined in the
context of transferable utility (TU) games. Given that agents
out of C work independently, an univocal v(C) is obtained for
each C, and (9) could be interpreted as a TU-game by simply
assuming a redefined game v′(C, xN ) = v(C, xN )−v(∅, xN ).
This way, the Shapley value of this redefined game, which
trivially coincides with the Shapley value of the original
game (see [22]), will be considered here.
Given that the partitioning procedure proposed in this
paper will be performed by fixing/disconnecting some com-
munication links among the different agents, a measure of the
relevance of the links is required. Given a link l = {i, j} ∈ E ,
it is possible to redistribute the Shapley value of the agents
that are the end-points of this link, i.e., i and j, by means of
the following expression [23]:
ξl(N , v) = 1|Ei|φi(N , v)+
1
|Ej|φj(N , v), (11)
with Ei and Ej being, respectively, the set of links connected
to agents i and j. Notice that values ξl(N , v) satisfy efficiency
as the original Shapley value, i.e.,∑
l∈E
ξl(N , v) =
∑
i∈N
φi(N , v) = v(N , xN ). (12)
Note that (11) provides a way to arrange and compare the
links according to their relevance from a control-performance
perspective, which can be interpreted as a LinkRank, in the
line of [32]. This way, the lower this value is, the more useful
the link becomes. This is consistent with the Shapley value,
which associates useful players to lower values.
Remark 3: Equation (11) provides information from all
links l ∈ E by means of the Shapley value of agent-based
game (9), which is obtained by evaluating the corresponding
2|N | coalitions. This fact mitigates the combinatorial explo-
sion of the method proposed in [21], which depends on a link-
game that requires to evaluate 2|E | coalitions per game, with
|E | = f (|N |2) as shown in (3).
A. ESTIMATION OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE
In networks with a large number of agents it is not compu-
tationally feasible to compute (9) for every coalition. This
issue can be solved by using randomized methods such
as [28] and [29]. In particular, the method in [28] is used
here to provide an estimation of the Shapley value of each
agent calculated in polynomial time provided that (9) can
also be calculated in polynomial time, which will be shown
in Section V-B. To this end, the following alternative defini-
tion of the Shapley value, expressed in terms of all possible
orderings of players inN coming into coalition, i.e., |N |!, is
used in the sampling method given in [28]:
φi(N , v) = 1|N |!
∑
pi∈5(N )
mpii (N , v), ∀i ∈ N , (13)
where the orderings are assumed to be equiprobable, with
5(N ) being the collection of all permutations pi , and where
mpii (N , v) = v({j ∈ N : pi (j) ≤ pi (i)})
− v({j ∈ N : pi (j) < pi(i)}), (14)
is the marginal contribution of player i to the players that are
ranked before it in permutation pi .
The basics of themethod in [28] consist in choosing a given
number of random orderings from set 5(N ) for estimating
the Shapley value of each player. To this end, a set Q that
contains a sample of q different permutations pi , which are
taken with replacement and with equal probability from set
5(N ), is considered. This way, an estimation of the Shapley
value is given by the average of the marginal contributions
over set Q, i.e.,
φ˜i(N , v) = 1q
∑
pi∈Q
mpii (N , v), ∀i ∈ N . (15)
Equation (15) provides an approximation of the Shapley
value with desirable properties. In particular, as the Shapley
value, the estimator satisfies efficiency. Moreover, following
the central limit theorem, it holds [28] that the estimator
is a normal distribution with the following mean value and
standard deviation:
φ˜i(N , v) ∼ N
(
φi,
σ 2φi
q
)
, (16)
with
σ 2φi =
1
|N |!
∑
pi∈5(N )
(
mpii (N , v)− φi(N , v)
)2
, ∀i ∈ N .
(17)
Consequently, if the number of permutations q is chosen
satisfying the following condition, ∀i ∈ N [28]:
q ≥ Z
2
λ/2σ
2
φi
ε2
, (18)
the estimation error is is guaranteed to be bounded by [28]
P
(|φ˜i(N , v)− φi(N , v)| ≤ ε) ≥ 1− λ, (19)
with ε being the approximation error, Z ∼ N (0, 1), and
where Z2λ/2 is the value such that P(Z ≥ Z2λ/2) = λ/2, with
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Finally, note that by taking σφi = αε, i.e., propor-
tionally to the desired error, condition (18) is reduced to
q ≥ αZ2λ/2. (20)
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IV. SHAPLEY-VALUE-BASED PARTITIONING ALGORITHM
The main objective of the algorithm presented in this paper is
to find which agents should cooperate to improve the overall
system performance. Notice that, some preliminar steps are
needed before it can be launched. In the first place, there is a
pre-partitioning stage in which a set of atomic agents needs
to be defined by assigning states, actions and constraints to
minimum size entities that could work in a fully decentralized
fashion, i.e., without the need for communication with other
parts of the system. In this work, as it will be shown in
Section V-A, these agents stem from the constraints imposed
on the system by the node equations.
Once the agents are defined, a communication link
between each pair of agents is considered, with the full num-
ber of links given by (3). Then, it is needed to classify these
links according to their relevance in terms of their impact
on the overall system performance. To this end, a measure
index related to the Shapley value is associated with each
link as follows:
Measure Indices Procedure
Let (N , E) be a network that describes a set N of agents
connected by links l ∈ E . Consider also a measured ini-
tial state xˆN (k) and a forecast of the expected disturbances
WˆN (k : k + Np − 1). Then,
a) Calculate a size q that guarantees, following (18), that
the estimation error is under desired limits.
b) Compute φ˜i(N , v),∀i ∈ N , by using (15). For each
coalition C ∈ NC , the optimal input sequence over Np
is obtained by solving (8) for C and also for the agents
out of C. Only the first control input is applied, and the
rest of elements are discarded. At the next time step
these optimization problems are solved in a receding
horizon fashion. This process is performed during Tsim
time instants and the cumulated cost of this closed-loop
simulation is used to build v(C, xN ) by means of (9).
c) Redistribute the obtained Shapley value among the
links by indices ξ˜l(N , v), calculated by using (11).
Therefore, index ξ˜l(N , v) measures the impact of link l in
the control network. Based on these indices, it is possible to
rank the links, which in turns allows to obtain the following
subsets:
• Set Ec ⊆ E : it includes the links that are inexpensive
enough in control terms to always be fixed. This way,
agents connected by links belonging to Ec cooperate
together and will be merged in a single agent, which
corresponds to any of the communication components
in NC = {C1, C2, . . . , Cnc}.
• Set Ee ⊆ E : it comprises the links that are too costly
for the system in terms of control performance, and
therefore will be permanently disconnected.
Basically, the partitioning algorithm in this section is intro-
duced with the aim of determining sets Ec and Ee. Both sets
are initially assumed to be empty, and links will be gradually
included in those sets if they satisfy certain conditions. This
way, links in Ec(s) define the communication components
in NC(s) in a given iteration s ∈ N+. Some concepts that
will be needed to perform the partitioning are introduced
next:
• K : symbolizes the mean span among indices ξ˜l(N , v)
and it is defined by
K = ξ˜lmax (N , v)− ξ˜lmin (N , v)|E | , (21)
where lmax and lmin denote, respectively, the links with
maximum and minimum measure indices ξ˜l(N , v).
• Ci(s): denotes the component in NC(s) where agent i
belongs to.
• Ei(s): denotes the set of remaining links in E\Ec(s) con-
nected to agent i.
Notice that the sizes of sets Ci(s) and Ei(s) are inversely
related. Both sets will be of interest in the Shapley-value-
based partitioning algorithm, which is presented at the begin-
ning of the next page.
Notice that the inclusion of a new link l∗c in Ec(s)
depends on the size of the components at s that this link
if ξ˜ (s)l∗c (N , v)+ 0 < Lc AND Ci∗ (s) 6= Cj∗ (s)
H⇒

Ec(s+ 1) = Ec(s) ∪ l∗c ,
ξ˜
(s+1)
l (N , v) =

ξ˜
(s)
l (N , v), l /∈ {Ei∗ (s+ 1) ∪ Ej∗ (s+ 1)},
ξ˜
(s)
l (N , v)+
ρK
|Ei∗ (s+ 1)| , l ∈ Ei
∗ (s+ 1),
ξ˜
(s)
l (N , v)+
ρK
|Ej∗ (s+ 1)| , l ∈ Ej
∗ (s+ 1),
else if Ci∗ (s) = Cj∗ (s) H⇒
{Ec(s+ 1) = Ec(s) ∪ l∗c ,
ξ˜
(s+1)
l (N , v) = ξ˜ (s)l (N , v),
otherwise H⇒
{Ec(s+ 1) = Ec(s),
ξ˜
(s+1)
l (N , v) = ξ˜ (s)l (N , v).
(23)
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Partitioning Algorithm 1
Let ξ˜l(N , v) be the indices related to each link l ∈ E . LetLc,
Le ∈ R be given thresholds, verifyingLc ≤ Le. Finally, let
s be a counter variable.
I) Computation of set Ec
Let γ, ρ ∈ R+\{0}, ν ≥ 1 be scalar parameters. Let also
K be the mean span given by (21). Starting with s = 0, and
assuming ξ˜ (0)l (N , v) = ξ˜l(N , v) and Ec(0) = ∅, do
1) Obtain the link with minimum measure index from the
remaining links that are not yet included in set Ec(s),
i.e.,
l∗c = arg minl ξ˜
(s)
l (N , v), l ∈ E\Ec(s). (22)
2) Validate link l∗c = {i∗, j∗} as a suitable candidate to be
added to Ec(s), and update this set and the links neigh-
bors of l∗c consequently, doing, ∀l ∈ E\Ec(s + 1), the
procedure defined by (23), with 0 being calculated as
0 = γK (|Ci∗ (s)| + |Cj∗ (s)|)ν . (24)
3) Make s = s+1 and go to Step 1, while ξ˜ (s)l∗c (N , v) < Lc.
Otherwise, the procedure ends and set Ec is fully
determined, i.e., Ec = Ec(s).
II) Computation of set Ee
Starting again with s = 0, and assuming ξ˜ (0)l (N , v) =
ξ˜l(N , v), Ee(0) = ∅, do
4) Obtain the link with maximum measure index from the
remaining links, i.e.,
l∗e = arg maxl ξ˜
(s)
l (N , v), l ∈ E\(Ec ∪ Ee(s)). (25)
5) Validate link l∗e = {i∗, j∗} as a suitable candidate for set
Ee(s), and update this set consequently, doing
Ee(s+ 1) = Ee(s) ∪ l∗e , if ξ˜ (s)l∗e (N , v) > Le,
Ee(s+ 1) = Ee(s), otherwise. (26)
6) Make s = s + 1 and go to Step 4, while ξ˜ (s)l∗e (N , v) >
Le. Otherwise, the procedure ends and set Ee is fully
determined, i.e., Ee = Ee(s).
will connect. More specifically, 0 penalizes a new link can-
didate to Ec(s) before deciding whether it should be included
in that set, in case that this link would connect two different
components in NC(s), and proportionally to their cardinal-
ity. Additionally, in case that l∗c is accepted, the proposed
algorithm penalizes its neighboring links that remain in set
E\Ec(s + 1), by a term that is larger as less neighbors
of l∗c remain in that set, which in turns implies that l∗c is
more congested in Ec(s + 1). These mechanisms induce
size constraints on the components, which avoid ineffi-
cient partitionings that could lead to an almost central-
ized scheme. This way, the proposed parameters γ , ν and ρ
could be adjusted to obtain some properties of interest, e.g.,
to impose a maximum cardinality for any communication
component.
FIGURE 1. Two iteration steps in the process of obtaining set Ec.
Example 1: Take the network in Fig. 1, with six agents
connected by 15 links. In a given iteration s (see Fig. 1a),
it is obtained
Ec(s) =
{{1, 2}}, NC(s) = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}},
(27)
Then, consider that link l∗c = {i∗, j∗} = {1, 3} is proposed
to be fixed. The sets related to this link in iteration s are
described by
C1(s) = {1, 2}, E1(s) =
{{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 5}, {1, 6}},
C3(s) = {3}, E3(s) =
{{1, 3}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {3, 5}, {3, 6}}.
(28)
Assume at this point that ξ˜ (s)l∗c (N , v) + 0 < Lc. This way,
given that C1(s) 6= C3(s), the first statement in (23) is fulfilled,
hence link {1, 3} is included in set Ec(s + 1) (see Fig. 1b),
obtaining
Ec(s+ 1) =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}},
NC(s+ 1) =
{{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {5}, {6}},
C1(s+ 1) = C3(s+ 1) = {1, 2, 3},
E1(s+ 1) =
{{1, 4}, {1, 5}, {1, 6}},
E3(s+ 1) =
{{2, 3}, {3, 4}, {3, 5}, {3, 6}}. (29)
Therefore, ∀l ∈ E\Ec(s + 1), all measure indices are
updated if l belongs either to E1(s+1) or E3(s+1), by increas-
ing in an inversely proportional way to the cardinality of those
sets
ξ˜
(s+1)
l (N , v) = ξ˜ (s)l (N , v)+
ρK
3
, l ∈ E1(s+ 1),
ξ˜
(s+1)
l (N , v) = ξ˜ (s)l (N , v)+
ρK
4
, l ∈ E3(s+ 1). (30)
Finally, consider that l∗c = {i∗, j∗} = {2, 3} is also
proposed to be fixed. In that case, given that C2(s + 1) =
C3(s+1) = {1, 2, 3}, the second statement in (25) is satisfied,
and the link will be included in set Ec(s + 2). Nevertheless,
no updates on the measure indices of links l ∈ E\Ec(s + 2)
would be considered.
Once set Ec is fully determined, a new single agent cor-
responding to each component in NC is established, inde-
pendently of whether the agents inside this component are
directly or indirectly connected. Therefore, the system is
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reduced to |NC | new agents, which may communicate or not,
depending on the needs of the control scheme. The possible
links among the agents are denoted by EC = NC×NC , which
verifies |EC | = |NC |(|NC |−1)2 , according to (3). That is, links
lC ∈ EC are defined as
lC = {Ca, Cb}, ∀Ca, Cb∈NC . (31)
Finally, the information provided by Ee is used to determine
links lC that should be permanently disconnected. Given that
links in Ee are referred to agents instead of components,
it is necessary to obtain a new set, say EeC , referred to
components. In this work, it is considered that two compo-
nents should not have a direct cooperation if all links that
interconnect the agents inside both components belong to
subset Ee, i.e.,
If l={i, j} ∈ Ee, ∀i ∈ Cˇa, ∀j∈ Cˇb−→ lˇC={Cˇa, Cˇb} ∈ EeC .
(32)
Summing up, the configuration of the system will be
described after performing the partitioning by the following
network: (NC, EC\EeC ), (33)
where the links in EC\EeC may be dynamically enabled or dis-
abled at each time instant by means of a coalitional control
approach [22], [24].
Remark 4: The proposed Shapley-value-based algorithm
represents a heuristic methodology for the system partition-
ing that avoids an exhaustive exploration of every coalition
involved in the control scheme. Note that this methodol-
ogy is independent from the model dynamics or the game
choice, i.e., nonlinear systems or alternative definitions for
the game different to (9) are possible. For example, it might
be considered theoretical aspects such as stability or robust-
ness [2], [33], which are out of the scope here since this work
only focus on the partitioning methodology. Likewise, for the
sake of clarity, the class of linear systems described by (1),
which is widely studied in the literature, is assumed here.
Remark 5: The way the agents inside a component are
actually connected once the partitioning is performed is
beyond of the scope of this work. This issue could be dealt
with, e.g., by using spanning tree algorithms [34], [35],
in order to find the minimum set of links that is necessary
to connect all agents belonging to a given component. In any
case, note that the partitioning approach reduces the commu-
nication costs of the original centralized scheme, given that
the agents inside a component after performing the partition-
ing are only required to communicate to their neighbors.
Example 2: Consider again the network presented in
Example 1, with six agents and 15 links. Assume that after
applying the partitioning algorithm, sets Ec and Ee are given
by (see Fig. 2a):
Ec =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}},
Ee =
{{1, 6}, {3, 6}, {4, 6}, {5, 6}}. (34)
FIGURE 2. Establishing the components and their removed links by Ec
and Ee.
The links in Ec define the following components:
C1 = {1, 2, 3}, C2 = {4, 5}, C3 = {6}, (35)
which are also assumed to be connected by links {C1, C2},
{C1, C3} and {C2, C3}. From these three links, only link
{C2, C3} verifies the criterion given in (32), i.e., all links that
connect agents in components C2 and C3 are included in
set Ee. Hence, this link should be permanently disconnected.
Therefore, the final configuration of the network is shown
in Fig. 2b and it is given by
(NC, EC\EeC ) =
({C1, C2, C3}, {{C1, C2}, {C1, C3}}). (36)
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE CONTROL PERFORMANCE:
A PARTITIONING ALGORITHM FINE TUNING
The rationale behind the partitioning procedure is to pro-
vide a reasonable trade-off between control and communi-
cation costs. Therefore, the proposed Shapley-value-based
approach, denoted from now on by SVBA, provides us with
a suboptimal solution NC for the partitioning of an LSS,
where the optimal solution corresponds with the centralized
case (only one component) when communication costs are
not considered. Once NC is established, the closed-loop
system performance can be related to the cumulated cost
Jcum(NC), which is obtained by computing each component
C ∈ NC by using (9). Then, in order to give an insight of the
SVBA fitness, it would be interesting to compare the cumu-
lated cost of partitionNC with the rest of possible partitioning
approaches. Nevertheless, note that the number of ways to
partition a set of |N | agents into nonempty components is
given by the Bell number [36]
B|N | =
|N |∑
s=0
 1
s!
s∑
j=0
(−1)s−j
(
s
j
)
j|N |
, (37)
which becomes computationally infeasible for LSS so as
comparing NC with this full set. To solve this issue, here
it is considered the subset composed of all partitions N swiC ,
which differ from NC in the fact that only one agent i ∈ N
switches components. This set will be denoted by9N ,NC and
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its cardinality is given by
|9N ,NC | = |N ||NC | − |N |C|=1C |
(
|N |C|=1C | + 1
2
)
, (38)
where |N |C|=1C | is the number of singletons in NC . Note
that a new component could be formed assuming the agent
that switches components is not already a singleton in NC .
Likewise, redundant switches between any two singletons are
also discarded from set 9N ,NC .
Once set 9N ,NC is introduced, some related indices will
be obtained and compared with those of NC , which can be
interpreted as a sensitivity analysis of the SVBA. In partic-
ular, the minimum, maximum, and mean cumulated costs
of partitions N swiC ∈ 9N ,NC will be of interest. Likewise,
a parameter that computes the portion of partitionsN swiC that
are improved by NC will also be considered and symbolized
by ηp, with p being a certain uncertainty limit, i.e., to be
better than NC it is required to outperform its cost beyond
a certain threshold.
Notice also that the partitionwithminimum cumulated cost
from 9N ,NC , say N (1)C , provides a suboptimal solution that
improves NC . Consequently, it is possible to optimize recur-
sively the SVBA in a greedy fashion by using the minimum-
cost solutions N (r)C from the successive sets 9(r−1)N ,NC , whose
elements in turns admit that only one agent switches compo-
nents from partition N (r−1)C , with r ∈ N+, r > 1, i.e.,
N (r)C = arg minN swiC
Jcum(N swiC )
s.t. N swiC ∈ 9(r−1)N ,NC , (39)
until reaching any pre-established stopping criterion, e.g.,
a maximum number of iterations rmax or a minimum per-
formance improvement between iterations. This optimiza-
tion represents a fine tuning of the SVBA, denoted here by
SVBA-FT. Note that, as considered in the SVBA, some addi-
tional constraints should be included by the control designer
in the SVBA-FT to balance the size of the components.
Likewise, note that sets Ec, Ee and EeC could be modified as a
consequence of the fine tuning procedure. In any case, these
changes improve the performance of the optimized solution,
symbolized by N optC .
Remark 6: Given how 9N ,NC is built, the impact on
communication burden between two consecutive optimization
steps is negligible. Nevertheless, when a high number of
steps is performed, the aforementioned size constraints and
also a stopping criterion are necessary to avoid inefficient
centralized partitionings.
Example 3: Let the solution of the SVBA described by (35).
Following (37), the full set of different solutions for six agents
is given by B6 = 203, whereas the cardinality of 9N ,NC is
reduced to 17, according to (38). All partitions included in
that set are detailed in Table 1, where the switching agent
for each case with respect toNC is represented in blue color.
Note that the cases of any agent in C1 or C2 switching to a new
singleton C4 are taking into account. Consider for instance
TABLE 1. Set 9N ,NC related toNC described by (35).
that N optC , i.e., the solution after performing the fine tuning,
is given by Partition 14 in Table 1 as
Copt1 = {1, 2, 3}, Copt2 = {4}, Copt3 = {5, 6}. (40)
Then, note that link {5, 6} should be removed from set Ee.
Consequently, set EopteC and the final network configuration
for the SVBA-FT would be respectively described by
EopteC = ∅, (41a)
(N optC , E
opt
C \EopteC ) =
({Copt1 , Copt2 , Copt3 }, EoptC ), (41b)
with EoptC = N optC ×N optC .
V. CASE STUDY
The proposed partitioning scheme has been implemented
in the Barcelona DWN, which is managed by Aguas de
Barcelona, S.A. (AGBAR). The Barcelona DWN distributes
the water supplied by the Ter and Llobregat rivers, which
are regulated at their head by dams with an overall capac-
ity of 600 hm3, to the whole Barcelona metropolitan area.
Besides the rivers, some additional underground wells also
contribute to an overall flow of around 7m3/s, which becomes
potable by using four drinking water treatment plants. Given
the limits in the water flow provided by each source, there
exist different water prices depending on water treatments
and legal extraction canons.
A. COALITIONAL CONTROL MODEL
Control-oriented schemes for DWNs have been widely ana-
lyzed in [37] and [38]. In particular, the control approach
of the full Barcelona DWN discussed in [13] and [14] is
considered in this paper and depicted in Fig. 3. This model
contains a total amount of 63 tanks, 114 actuators – divided
into 75 pumps and 39 valves – and 88 sectors of consume that
represent the external disturbances. A graph that summarizes
the physical connections among the storage tanks and the
junction nodes is provided in Fig. 4.
In the approach proposed in this paper, as commented
before, an initial pre-partitioning into agents is performed
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FIGURE 3. Entire model of the Barcelona DWN [13], [14].
FIGURE 4. Graph representing the full Barcelona DWN, where the tanks
are denoted by x, the junction nodes by N, and with the arrows
representing the directions of the flows.
due to the node equations that appear in the system
(see Fig. 3), e.g.,
u(25)−u(27)−u(28)−u(29)−u(105)−d(15) = 0,
u(27)−u(26)−d(36) = 0, (42)
physically connect flows u(25), u(26), u(27), u(28), u(29)
and u(105). Hence, the values of these flows must be
simultaneously determined. For this reason, they are assigned
to the same agent. As a consequence, the only coupling
among the subsystems is due to the inputs effect in the
dynamical model. Therefore, in the case study, Aij = 0
in (1), and equivalently, ACj = 0 in (4). Considering this
approach, 43 agents have been obtained, where the criterion
of considering outflows as disturbances has been assumed,
i.e., agents control their inflows. The explicit definition of
each agent is included in Appendix, where the identification
of Agent 1 is detailed as an example.
Remark 7: Following this approach, the constraints
imposed by the node equations are assigned to a given agent
and are always satisfied. This fact represents an advantage
with respect to the partitioning performed in [13], where
the agents do not satisfy in general the node equations
and the resulting components need to communicate partially
following a hierarchical structure and generating virtual
demands among them, i.e., they cannot work in a truly
decentralized fashion.
From an overall centralized viewpoint, the following equa-
tions are satisfied:
xN (k + 1) = AN xN (k)+ BN uN (k)+ BpN dN (k),
(43a)
0 = EN uN (k)+ EdN dN (k), (43b)
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with xN (k) ∈ R63, uN (k) ∈ R114 and dN (k) ∈ R88.
This way, (43a) corresponds with the dynamics of the storage
tanks, and (43b) describes the network static relations due to
the mass balance at each of the 17 junction nodes (see Fig. 3),
with EN ∈ R17×114 and EdN ∈ R17×88 being weighting
matrices of proper dimensions.
Finally, consider the main physical constraints of the DWN
given by the variables related to the tank volumes and manip-
ulated flows, i.e., ∀k
xminN ≤ xN (k) ≤ xmaxN ,
uminN ≤ uN (k) ≤ umaxN . (44)
Remark 8: Soft constraints have been introduced to imple-
ment the state constraints in (44). This fact, combined with the
pre-partitioning based on the node equations, avoid infeasi-
bility issues when solving the optimization problems.
Remark 9: In order to assess the impact of the links from a
decision-making viewpoint, it is assumed that each agent has
access to overall state xN (k), and knows how its decisions
affect the overall system. However, decisions can only be
coordinated inside coalitions, i.e., even when the different
coalitions try to optimize the overall system performance,
they cannot agree upon the value of the system variables.
B. CONTROL OBJECTIVE: SYSTEM
MANAGEMENT CRITERIA
The following management policies for the Barcelona DWN
are considered given the knowledge of the system and the per-
formance objectives to be reached (see [13], [14] for details):
• Minimizing drinking water production and transport
costs due to chemicals, legal canons and electricity costs,
which are expressed as
f1,i(k) = (We1α1 +We2α2(k))Tui(k), (45)
where vector α1 ∈ Rnui corresponds to water costs,
vector α2(k) ∈ Rnui considers time-dependent electric-
ity costs, and matrices We1 ,We2 ∈ Rnui×nui add the
corresponding prioritization to the aforementioned costs
within the related multi-objective optimization problem.
• Maintaining the stored volume around a given safety
value in case of emergency, which is achieved by
minimizing
f2,i(k) = ςTi (k)Wxς i(k), (46)
with
xi(k) ≥ xsafi − ς i(k) ≥ 0, (47)
where xsafi ∈ Rnxi is a vector of safety volume thresh-
olds in m3 (conveniently determined according to the
management company policies related to the DWN),
with ς i(k) ∈ Rnxi representing the amount of volume
going down from the desired thresholds, and where
Wx ∈ Rnxi×nxi is a weighting matrix.
• Penalizing sudden variations of the control inputs by
minimizing
f3,i(k) = 1uTi (k)R1u1ui(k), (48)
where 1ui(k) = ui(k) − ui(k − 1), and with
R1u ∈ Rnui×nui also being a weighting matrix.
Hence, the individual cost related to agent i ∈ N that is
considered in this paper is given by
`i(xi(k),ui(k)
) = f1,i(k)+ f2,i(k)+ f3,i(k). (49)
Finally, the aggregate cost of a certain communication com-
ponent C is defined by
`C(xC(k),uC(k)
) =∑
i∈C
`i(xi(k),ui(k)
)
, (50)
given that no couplings on the cost are considered in
this work.
Remark 10: Considering how (50) is built, (8) results in a
quadratic programming (QP) problem. Therefore, convexity
is guaranteed in the proposed approach, which allows a fast
calculation of the solution for each optimization problem and
a computation of (9) in polynomial time, as required in [28].
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
The Shapley-value-based partitioning algorithm presented in
this paper has been tested for the Barcelona DWN by using
the Matlab R© solver quadprog in a 3.4 GHz Intel Octa-
Core R© i7-6400, 16 GB RAM computer. This way, a coali-
tional MPC scheme has been implemented in closed loop by
considering Tsim = 24 simulation instants (one day), andwith
Np = 12. The numerical values of the performance parame-
ters are determined by a trial-and-error procedure, resulting
in We1 = 0.9I, We2 = 0.5I, Wx = 10I, R1u = 0.1I,
with I being the identity matrix of suitable dimensions. Note
also that there is no reference when considering (46), i.e., the
controller chooses the most appropriate water volumes that
satisfy the soft constraints imposed by xsafi . Likewise, the ini-
tial state is constant for all possible coalitions and is slightly
above the minimum safety level.
The Shapley values for the 43 agents cannot be directly
computed due to computational issues, which are solved here
via the randomized method [28] introduced in Section III-A,
considering ε = 0.2σφi , ∀i ∈ N , λ = 0.1, and Zλ/2 =
1.6449, which, in order to verify (20), requires a sample
Q with q = 68 permutation vectors. According to (3),
the 43 agents are related to 903 possible communication
links. Likewise, the redistribution of the estimated Shapley
value of the agent-based game to the links is obtained by
using (11). Notice that for the estimation of the Shapley value,
43 · q coalitions have been evaluated by means of (9). The
performance of these coalitions in terms of their cardinality
is represented in Fig. 5, where it can be seen a low correla-
tion between cardinality and coalition performance. In other
words, the key of the partitioning performance is not related
to group as many agents as possible but to select the clusters
of cooperating agents properly.
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FIGURE 5. Cost of the coalitions needed by the randomized method in
terms of their cardinality. Note that there are coalitions with few agents
and proper performance – closer to the grand coalition – and vice versa,
i.e., coalitions with many agents and performance similar to the empty
coalition.
FIGURE 6. Estimated redistributions of the Shapley value. Yellowest and
bluest colors represent most expensive and cheapest links, respectively.
It can be seen that agents 2, 3 and 38 are endpoints of the links with best
performance, whereas agents 23 and 40 are related to the links with the
worst ones.
TABLE 2. Indices ξ˜l (N , v) for the 20 best/worst performance links.
The corresponding index ξ˜l(N , v) for every link l = {i, j} is
represented in a color scale in Fig. 6. Likewise, the values for
the 20 best/worst performance links are explicitly indicated
in Table 2.
A. SHAPLEY-VALUE-BASED PARTITIONING
APPROACH (SVBA)
The proposed partitioning approach has been tested with the
following thresholds, which have been determined by a trial-
and-error tuning procedure:
Lc = 1.0× 107, (51a)
γ = 2.5, ν = 2.3, ρ = 100, (51b)
Le = 1.5× 107, (52)
where several requirements have been considered in the
adjustment of the aforementioned thresholds. In the first
place, a cardinality constraint for any component of 0.2|N |
has been imposed, for our primary goal is to avoid compo-
nents larger than one fifth of the system agents. Secondary
goals were also considered, specifically to increase the cardi-
nality of the resulting components so as to reduce the number
of singletons.
Notice that Ee is completely delimited by Le. Likewise,
with parameters in (51b) set to zero, set Ec would also be com-
pletely determined by Lc. Under this premise, it is possible
to represent the cardinality of both sets Ec and Ee as a function
of any threshold corresponding to either Lc or Le, which is
depicted in Fig. 7. Notice that both functions are symmetric
given that in the limit case, i.e.,Lc = Le = L , it is trivially
verified
|Ec(L )| + |Ee(L )| = |E |. (53)
FIGURE 7. Cardinality of sets Ec and Ee as a function of a given threshold
L , for the particular case of not considering parameters to balance the
size of the resulting components, i.e., γ = ρ = 0. The red crosses refer to
the chosen thresholds, i.e., |Ec(Lc)| = 699 and |Ee(Le)| = 65.
As seen in Fig. 7, set Ec for γ = ρ = 0 would be composed
of 699 links. Note that these links connect all agents in N ,
achieving the grand coalition, i.e., NC = {N }. For this
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FIGURE 8. Links belonging to Ec after applying the partitioning
procedure, with their performance normalized. This way, value ‘‘0’’ refers
to the link with best performance, i.e., {2,38}, and it is drawn in pure
green, and value ‘‘1’’ is related to the link with worst performance out of
the 52 links in Ec, i.e., {11,25}, and it is represented in pure yellow.
reason, (51b) is considered to penalize not only incoming
links in Ec(s), but also their remaining neighbors in E\Ec(s).
As a result, the following 52 links have been obtained and
drawn in Fig. 8 in a color scale between green and yellow,
with darkest links representing the useful ones:
Ec =
{{2, 38}, {2, 3}, {2, 37}, {3, 38}, {37, 38}, {1, 2},
{3, 37}, {1, 38}, {2, 32}, {2, 5}, {2, 42}, {2, 27}, {1, 3},
{32, 38}, {5, 38}, {38, 42}, {27, 38}, {1, 37}, {3, 32},
{3, 5}, {3, 42}, {3, 27}, {32, 37}, {5, 37}, {37, 42},
{27, 37}, {1, 32}, {1, 5}, {1, 42}, {1, 27}, {5, 32},
{32, 42}, {5, 42}, {16, 29}, {4, 15}, {24, 34}, {27, 32},
{4, 29}, {15, 16}, {4, 16}, {15, 29}, {5, 27}, {27, 42},
{24, 36}, {34, 36}, {21, 43}, {13, 14}, {18, 26},
{17, 30}, {10, 19}, {7, 22}, {11, 25}}, (54)
obtaining therefore the corresponding partitioning approach
described below:
NC =
{ C1︷ ︸︸ ︷{1, 2, 3, 5, 27, 32, 37, 38, 42}, C2︷ ︸︸ ︷{4, 15, 16, 29},
C3︷ ︸︸ ︷
{24, 34, 36},
C4︷ ︸︸ ︷
{7, 22},
C5︷ ︸︸ ︷
{10, 19},
C6︷ ︸︸ ︷
{11, 25},
C7︷ ︸︸ ︷
{13, 14},
C8︷ ︸︸ ︷
{17, 30},
C9︷ ︸︸ ︷
{18, 26},
C10︷ ︸︸ ︷
{21, 43},
C11︷︸︸︷
{6} ,
C12︷︸︸︷
{8} ,
C13︷︸︸︷
{9} ,
C14︷︸︸︷
{12},
C15︷︸︸︷
{20},
C16︷︸︸︷
{23},
C17︷︸︸︷
{28},
C18︷︸︸︷
{31},
C19︷︸︸︷
{33},
C20︷︸︸︷
{35},
C21︷︸︸︷
{39},
C22︷︸︸︷
{40},
C23︷︸︸︷
{41} }.
(55)
Likewise, Ee is composed by the following 65 links:
Ee=
{{23, 40}, {28, 40}, {23, 28}, {33, 40}, {23, 33},
{20, 40}, {20, 23}, {39, 40}, {23, 39}, {12, 40},
{12, 23}, {8, 40}, {8, 23}, {28, 33}, {20, 28}, {28, 39},
{12, 28}, {9, 40}, {6, 40}, {31, 40}, {9, 23}, {6, 23},
{40, 41}, {23, 31}, {23, 41}, {35, 40}, {25, 40},
{11, 40}, {22, 40}, {23, 35}, {7, 40}, {10, 40},
{19, 40}, {17, 40}, {30, 40}, {18, 40}, {26, 40},
{20, 33}, {23, 25}, {14, 40}, {11, 23}, {22, 23},
{7, 23}, {10, 23}, {19, 23}, {17, 23}, {23, 30},
{18, 23}, {23, 26}, {13, 40}, {14, 23}, {33, 39},
{13, 23}, {20, 39}, {12, 33}, {12, 20}, {21, 40},
{12, 39}, {21, 23}, {40, 43}, {36, 40}, {23, 43},
{23, 36}, {8, 28}, {8, 33}}, (56)
and the corresponding set EeC is given by
EeC =
{{C14, C15}, {C14, C21}, {C15, C21}, {C16, Ch}h≥4\{16},
{C17, Ch}h={12,14,15,19,21}, {C19, Ch}h={12,14,15,21},
{C22, Ch}h≥4\{22}
}
. (57)
Finally, the overall network after performing the par-
titioning by the SVBA would be described by (55)
and (57), achieving the network configuration specified
in (33).
B. PARTITIONING APPROACH FINE TUNING (SVBA-FT)
The partitioning approach has been optimized for a simula-
tion of a day with average demand and disturbances, starting
by finding the partition with minimum cumulated cost N (1)C
from set 9(0)N ,NC = 9N ,NC , which in turns is obtained from
solution NC described by (55). This optimization procedure
has been recursively applied considering size constraints sim-
ilar to those of the SVBA, i.e.,
|Cs|≤d0.2|N |e=d8.6e=9, ∀Cs ∈ N (r)C , s = 1, . . . , nc,
(58)
and the following stopping criterion:
γ (r) < 1%, (59)
with
γ (r) = 1
3
2∑
j=0
(
Jcum(N (r−3+j)C )− Jcum(N (r−2+j)C )
Jcum(N (r−3+j)C )
)
, (60)
where a 3-step average performance improvement has been
considered, taking Jcum(N (0)C ) = Jcum(NC) = 1.0662×108,
r ∈ N+, r > 3.
The results related to every iteration are detailed in Table 3,
where only rstop = 7 steps have been needed to fulfill the
stopping criterion described by (59), which indicates that
the solution in (55) is indeed a suitable starting point. Note
that the number of partitions explored by the greedy proce-
dure can be easily calculated by
∑rstop−1
r=0 |9(r)N ,NC | = 6143.
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TABLE 3. SVBA-FT optimization procedure.
The definitive solution after applying the optimization
procedure is determined by
N optC =
{ Copt1︷ ︸︸ ︷{1, 2, 3, 27, 32, 37, 38, 42, 43}, C
opt
2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{4, 5, 9, 15, 16, 29},
Copt3︷ ︸︸ ︷
{10, 17, 19},
Copt4︷ ︸︸ ︷
{24, 34, 36},
Copt5︷ ︸︸ ︷
{11, 12},
Copt6︷ ︸︸ ︷
{13, 14},
Copt7︷ ︸︸ ︷
{18, 26},
Copt8︷ ︸︸ ︷
{21, 22},
Copt9︷︸︸︷
{6} ,
Copt10︷︸︸︷
{7} ,
Copt11︷︸︸︷
{8} ,
Copt12︷︸︸︷
{20},
Copt13︷︸︸︷
{23},
Copt14︷︸︸︷
{25},
Copt15︷︸︸︷
{28},
Copt16︷︸︸︷
{30},
Copt17︷︸︸︷
{31},
Copt18︷︸︸︷
{33},
Copt19︷︸︸︷
{35},
Copt20︷︸︸︷
{39},
Copt21︷︸︸︷
{40},
Copt22︷︸︸︷
{41} }.
(61)
Finally, note that the switches performed as a result of the
optimization procedure do not imply to remove any commu-
nication link in set Ee. Consequently, set EeC remains constant
with respect to (57), being the final network configuration
described by
(N optC , E
opt
C \EeC ), (62)
with EoptC = N optC ×N optC . In any case, note that cheaper/more
expensive agents illustrated in Fig. 6 are not affected by the
changes introduced by the fine tuning.
Remark 11: Given that the proposed procedure optimizes
discrete variables, i.e., the components, γ (r) might increase
in further iterations with r. That is, there is no guarantee
that the imposed limit becomes a bound for later iterations.
Nevertheless, the average way in which γ (r) is defined miti-
gates this possibility.
C. COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED PARTITIONING
SOLUTIONS WITH OTHER SCHEMES IN THE LITERATURE
In this section, both the original and refined proposed
partitioning solutions will be compared with the solu-
tions obtained by applying other different partitioning
approaches [10], [13] to the full Barcelona DWN, and also
with the centralized and decentralized configurations.
1) AN ALTERNATIVE BARCELONA DWN
PARTITIONING SCHEME
In [13], an alternative partitioning method of the same
Barcelona DWN model analyzed in this paper, which
basically consists in a graph-theory-based approach (GTBA),
is proposed. Nevertheless, that work follows a different cri-
terion to define the agents, and for this reason their results
are not directly comparable with the approach proposed here.
With the aim of providing a way to compare all approaches,
it has been considered that each of the 43 agents defined
here belong to a component described in [13] if all its related
variables, i.e., states, inputs, disturbances, are contained into
this component. Under this assumption, which represents
an approximation of the partitioning in [13], most of the
43 agents have been distributed into the six components
in [13], with the exception of agents 1 and 2, which have been
assumed to belong to new independent components. Taking
this fact into account, the partitioning provided by the GTBA
can be modeled by
NGTBAC =
{ CGTBA1︷ ︸︸ ︷{24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 37, 38, 42, 43},
CGTBA2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20},
CGTBA3︷ ︸︸ ︷
{29, 30, 31, 32},
CGTBA4︷ ︸︸ ︷
{33, 34, 35, 36},
CGTBA5︷ ︸︸ ︷
{21, 22, 23},
CGTBA6︷ ︸︸ ︷
{3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 39, 40, 41},
CGTBA7︷︸︸︷
{1} ,
CGTBA8︷︸︸︷
{2} },
(63)
where it can be seen that this solution does not respect the
size constraints imposed to the SVBA/SVBA-FT, which rep-
resents an advantage for the GTBA.
2) A PARTITIONING APPROACH APPLIED TO OTHER DWN
In [10], a partitioning approach based on social network
algorithms (SNBA) is introduced and applied to the Parete
DWN, located in the South of Caserta, Italy. Basically, this
approach uses the centrality index called edge betweenness
as a metric to identify the boundaries of communities [39].
Let (V,L) be a directed graph that describes the direction of
the flows, symbolized by links lf ∈ L, among any pair of
vertices {s, t} ∈ V , which are related to water entities, e.g.,
tanks. The edge betweenness cB(lf) of a link lf is defined as
the number of optimal paths between vertex pairs that run
along link lf, summed over all vertex pairs, as follows [40]:
cB(lf) =
∑
{s,t}∈V
σ (s, t|lf)
σ (s, t)
, (64)
where σ (s, t) is the number of shortest (s, t)-paths, and
σ (s, t|lf) is the number of those paths passing through link lf.
This way, an optimal community cluster can be defined
by progressively removing edges with high value of edge
betweenness from the original graph [39]. In other words,
index (64) identifies edges in a network that lie between
communities, which can be progressively removed leaving
behind just the communities themselves.
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FIGURE 9. Graph (V,L) representing the direction of the flows among
the 43 agents for the full Barcelona DWN. As it can be seen, agent 2 has a
strong centrality regarding the flows.
Note that for the Barcelona DWN case study, the direction
of the flows among the water tanks and junction nodes is
described by graph in Fig. 4. Given that in this work a pre-
partitioning into agents has been made, to properly apply the
scheme proposed in [10] it is needed to map the previous
graph into a new one that depicts the direction of the flows
among the agents. As a result, graph (V,L) represented
in Fig. 9, with V = N = 43 agents and L = 49
directed links has been obtained, where each agent comprises
information regarding several tanks and nodes following the
criterion established in Section V-A. Once graph (V,L) is
established, it is possible to compute index (64) for all these
49 directed links. Finally, in order to obtain the partitioning
solution, the links with higher edge betweenness have been
progressively removed until achieve the stopping criterion of
a maximum cardinality for any component of 0.2|N |, as done
in the partitioning approach proposed in this paper. As a
result, 18 links have been removed, which are depicted by
green dashed arrows in Fig. 9, and explicitly represented joint
to their cB(lf) in Table 4. The resulting partitioning scheme is
given below:
N SNBAC =
{ CSNBA1︷ ︸︸ ︷{2, 6, 7, 8, 29, 31, 33, 36, 41},
CSNBA2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{1, 3, 21, 22, 23, 25, 37, 38},
CSNBA3︷ ︸︸ ︷
{15, 16, 19},
CSNBA4︷ ︸︸ ︷
{4, 5},
CSNBA5︷ ︸︸ ︷
{10, 11},
CSNBA6︷ ︸︸ ︷
{13, 14},
CSNBA7︷ ︸︸ ︷
{18, 20},
CSNBA8︷ ︸︸ ︷
{24, 26},
CSNBA9︷ ︸︸ ︷
{27, 42},
CSNBA10︷ ︸︸ ︷
{28, 43},
CSNBA11︷ ︸︸ ︷
{30, 32},
CSNBA12︷ ︸︸ ︷
{34, 35},
CSNBA13︷ ︸︸ ︷
{39, 40},
CSNBA14︷︸︸︷
{9} ,
CSNBA15︷︸︸︷
{12} ,
CSNBA16︷︸︸︷
{17} }. (65)
Remark 12: Directed graph (V,L) = (N ,L) has nothing
to do with complete undirected graph (N , E), which was
used in the partitioning algorithm proposed in Section IV.
TABLE 4. Edge betweenness cB(lf) of directed links lf removed from
graph in Fig. 9 to find communities.
TABLE 5. Sensitivity analysis of the different schemes.
The former represents the direction of the physical flows
among the agents, i.e., |L| = 49, whereas the latter assumes
that all agents are initially interconnected, i.e., |E | = 903,
to later classify these undirected communication links into
sets Ec and Ee regarding their control performance.
3) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS COMPARISON
All approaches have been tested by using the sensitivity anal-
ysis introduced in Section IV, where the solutions, defined
respectively by (55), (61), (63), (65), and also the central-
ized (CEN) and decentralized (DEC) configurations, have
been comparedwith those in their corresponding sets9N ,NC .
The cardinality of these sets (obtained by (38)) and the related
indices are illustrated in Table 5 for the same average day
used in the previous section, where an uncertainty limit of
p = 0.1% has been assumed in the computation of ηp. As
expected, the value Jmincum(9N ,NC ) of the SVBA corresponds
with the first step of the optimization procedure in Table 3.
Note that |9N ,NC | provides the number of partitioning
solutions explored in the sensitivity analysis. Nevertheless,
only the solutions of that set that satisfy the size constraints,
i.e., maximum cardinality for any component of 0.2|N |,
should be considered. This way, note that the CEN has been
included in this comparison even without any element in
the corresponding set 9N ,NC trivially satisfying this size
constraint, which explains its best performance. Likewise,
as commented before, there are two components of the GTBA
that also do not respect the size constraints, which represent
an advantage to this scheme in the comparisons.
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As can be seen, the values of Jcum(NC), Jmincum(9N ,NC )
and Jmaxcum (9N ,NC ) for the SVBA/SVBA-FT improve those of
the GTBA, SNBA and DEC. That is, the proposed solutions
improve the performance of the rest. According to ηp, it can
be checked that the SVBA outperforms a higher portion
of partitioning solutions in corresponding sets 9N ,NC than
the GTBA and SNBA, and is in the order of the DEC,
which in any case is improved by the SVBA-FT. This find-
ing is consistent with Fig. 5, which already illustrated that
only a few topological changes in the network can increase
the performance substantially. Note as well that the SVBA/
SVBA-FT also outperform the other methods when the dif-
ference between the cost of the different approaches and the
corresponding minimum in their set of alternatives 9N ,NC
is examined, i.e., the proposed approaches are closer to these
minimum-cost solutions than the other methods. Likewise,
it is interesting to check that both the SVBA and SVBA-FT
have a better performance than the mean performance of that
set, i.e., Jcum(NC) < Jµcum(9N ,NC ), which is also the case of
the SNBA but does not occur in the GTBA and DEC. Finally,
notice that all parameters in the optimized scheme SVBA-FT
improve those in the SVBA, as expected. All in all, these
results indicate that both proposed approaches outperform the
rest of schemes.
D. PARTITIONING LONG-SIMULATION OVERVIEW
A comparison between the different schemes considered in
this paper is summarized in Table 6, where the cumulated
cost of a 30-day simulation scenario with demand and dis-
turbances taken from real data has been calculated for each
approach. Note that it is reasonable to test the results in a
longer scenario than the one used for the design, i.e., one day.
It can be seen that both the SVBA and SVBA-FT improve the
results of the GTBA, SNBA and DEC, showing the effective-
ness of the partitioning algorithm proposed in this paper.
TABLE 6. Overview of the different methods considered.
Notice that the SVBA provides us with a suboptimal solu-
tion within the set of B43 options (recall (37)), which rep-
resents a suitable starting point for the fine tuning. Then,
the goal of the SVBA-FT is to increase the performance by
carrying out a greedy search around SVBA. In particular,
significant gains can be obtained by reducing any violation of
constraints, which are severely penalized by soft constraints.
Also, the fine tuning helps to mitigate possible deviations
introduced by the randomized method used for the estimation
of the Shapley value. In any case, note that the fact that of
some links originally included in sets Ec /Ee could be removed
due to the SVBA-FT does not break any physical constraints
of the original DWN given that these constraints are used
to define the agents. This is not the case of other schemes
such us [10], where a fine tuning procedure could break some
physical/topological connections.
Finally, these partitioning results can be improved once the
communication components start exchanging information,
e.g., by using a coalitional control scheme [22], [24].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a heuristic partitioning algorithm for LSS has
been introduced considering that agents are able to operate
in a decentralized fashion. This method ranks the commu-
nication links inside a network from a control-performance
perspective. A game over agents based on the utilization of
coalitional MPC to control the plant has been considered, and
a randomized method has been used to estimate their Shapley
value to deal with combinatorial explosion issues. The redis-
tribution of the estimated Shapley value of the agents among
the links has been proposed as a measure of their relevance in
the control system and to fix/remove them.
The proposed algorithm calculates sets Ec and Ee. The links
in the former set will determine the communication com-
ponents, where several mechanisms to avoid the formation
of large clusters of cooperating agents have been consid-
ered. Once the components are established, some connections
among them are disconnected by using the information in
the latter set, providing a proper configuration of the overall
network. The resulting partitioning has also been refined by
a method that optimizes it recursively, based on some cost
indices and size constraints. Both the original and refined
approaches have been tested with the Barcelona DWN as a
case study, providing reasonable solutions that outperform
other partitioning schemes available in the literature.
APPENDIX
STATES, INPUTS AND DISTURBANCES
RELATED TO THE AGENTS
As mentioned in Section V-A, the flows belonging to the
following node equations:
u(25)− u(27)− u(28)− u(29)− u(105)− d(15) = 0,
u(27)− u(26)− d(36) = 0,
(66)
are physically interconnected, in particular by means of flow
u(27). Then, all states that comprise incoming flows involved
in (66), which are represented in bold blue color, should
belong to the same agent, i.e.,
x+(22)= x(22)+ u(22)+ u(26)− u(23)− d(23),
x+(27)= x(27)+ u(28)+ u(29)− u(30)− d(28),
x+(57)= x(57)+ u(80)+ u(89)+ u(105)− u(78), (67)
where superindex + refers to the successors state. Finally,
note that outflows in the states – drawn in red color – are
considered here as disturbances.
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By considering this approach, the following 43 Agents
have been obtained:
• Agent 1:
– States: x(22), x(27), x(57).
– Inputs: u(22), u(25), u(26), u(27), u(28), u(29),
u(80), u(89), u(105).
– Disturbances: d(15), d(23), d(28), d(36), u(23),
u(30), u(78).
• Agent 2:
– States: x(7), x(8), x(9), x(10), x(32), x(35), x(38),
x(42), x(43), x(44), x(45), x(46), x(48), x(49),
x(50), x(53), x(55), x(56), x(60).
– Inputs: u(7), u(8), u(9), u(10), u(33), u(36), u(40),
u(41), u(44), u(45), u(46), u(47), u(48), u(49),
u(50), u(51), u(52), u(53), u(54), u(55), u(56),
u(57), u(58), u(59), u(61), u(62), u(63), u(64),
u(66), u(67), u(70), u(71), u(72), u(74), u(75),
u(76), u(77), u(78), u(79), u(81), u(82), u(83),
u(84), u(85), u(86), u(87), u(90), u(91), u(92),
u(93), u(95), u(96), u(97), u(106), u(107), u(110),
u(111), u(113), u(114).
– Disturbances: d(7), d(8), d(9), d(10), d(32), d(40),
d(42), d(43), d(45), d(47), d(50), d(52), d(53),
d(54), d(55), d(57), d(58), d(59), d(60), d(62),
d(63), d(64), d(65), d(69), d(70), d(71), d(72),
d(73), d(74), d(75), d(76), d(77), d(79), d(80),
d(81), d(82), d(83), d(84), u(3), u(4), u(5), u(6),
u(13), u(21), u(38), u(42), u(43), u(60), u(67),
u(68), u(69), u(72), u(74), u(94), u(95), u(98),
u(101), u(106), u(107), u(108), u(109), u(111),
u(112).
• Agent 3:
– States: x(59).
– Inputs: u(102), u(103), u(104).
– Disturbances: u(88), u(89), u(97).
• Agent 4:
– States: x(1).
– Inputs: u(1).
– Disturbances: d(1).
• Agent 5:
– States: x(2).
– Inputs: u(2).
– Disturbances: d(2), u(1).
• Agent 6:
– States: x(3).
– Inputs: u(3).
– Disturbances: d(3).
• Agent 7:
– States: x(4).
– Inputs: u(4).
– Disturbances: d(4).
• Agent 8:
– States: x(5).
– Inputs: u(5).
– Disturbances: d(5).
• Agent 9:
– States: x(6).
– Inputs: u(6).
– Disturbances: d(6), u(2).
• Agent 10:
– States: x(11).
– Inputs: u(11).
– Disturbances: d(11).
• Agent 11:
– States: x(12).
– Inputs: u(12).
– Disturbances: d(12), u(11).
• Agent 12:
– States: x(13).
– Inputs: u(13).
– Disturbances: d(13), u(12).
• Agent 13:
– States: x(14).
– Inputs: u(14).
– Disturbances: d(14).
• Agent 14:
– States: x(15).
– Inputs: u(15).
– Disturbances: d(16), u(14).
• Agent 15:
– States: x(16).
– Inputs: u(16).
– Disturbances: d(17).
• Agent 16:
– States: x(17).
– Inputs: u(17).
– Disturbances: d(18).
• Agent 17:
– States: x(18).
– Inputs: u(18).
– Disturbances: d(19), u(15).
• Agent 18:
– States: x(19).
– Inputs: u(19).
– Disturbances: d(20).
• Agent 19:
– States: x(20).
– Inputs: u(20).
– Disturbances: d(21), u(16), u(17).
• Agent 20:
– States: x(21).
– Inputs: u(21).
– Disturbances: d(22), u(18), u(19), u(20).
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• Agent 21:
– States: x(23).
– Inputs: u(23).
– Disturbances: d(24), u(24).
• Agent 22:
– States: x(24).
– Inputs: u(24).
– Disturbances: d(25), d(38).
• Agent 23:
– States: x(25).
– Inputs: u(30).
– Disturbances: d(26).
• Agent 24:
– States: x(26).
– Inputs: u(31).
– Disturbances: d(27), d(35).
• Agent 25:
– States: x(30).
– Inputs: u(32).
– Disturbances: d(34).
• Agent 26:
– States: x(28).
– Inputs: u(34).
– Disturbances: d(29), u(31).
• Agent 27:
– States: x(29).
– Inputs: u(35).
– Disturbances: d(30), d(37).
• Agent 28:
– States: x(36).
– Inputs: u(37).
– Disturbances: d(41).
• Agent 29:
– States: x(34).
– Inputs: u(38).
– Disturbances: d(39).
• Agent 30:
– States: x(40).
– Inputs: u(39).
– Disturbances: d(51).
• Agent 31:
– States: x(39).
– Inputs: u(42).
– Disturbances: d(48), d(49).
• Agent 32:
– States: x(41).
– Inputs: u(43).
– Disturbances: d(56), u(39).
• Agent 33:
– States: x(47).
– Inputs: u(60).
– Disturbances: d(61).
• Agent 34:
– States: x(51).
– Inputs: u(65).
– Disturbances: d(66).
• Agent 35:
– States: x(52).
– Inputs: u(68).
– Disturbances: d(67), u(65).
• Agent 36:
– States: x(54).
– Inputs: u(69).
– Disturbances: d(68).
• Agent 37:
– States: x(33).
– Inputs: u(73), u(108).
– Disturbances: d(33), u(32), u(33).
• Agent 38:
– States: x(58).
– Inputs: u(88).
– Disturbances: d(78), u(73), u(80), u(82), u(87).
• Agent 39:
– States: x(61).
– Inputs: u(94), u(98), u(99).
– Disturbances: d(85), u(93), u(100).
• Agent 40:
– States: x(62).
– Inputs: u(100).
– Disturbances: d(87), d(88).
• Agent 41:
– States: x(63).
– Inputs: u(101).
– Disturbances: d(86).
• Agent 42:
– States: x(31).
– Inputs: u(109).
– Disturbances: d(31), u(34), u(35).
• Agent 43:
– States: x(37).
– Inputs: u(112).
– Disturbances: d(44), d(46), u(37), u(114).
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